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NOTES
Discriminatory Practices in Exclusive Hiring Halls
Union executed a collective bargaining contract with a trucking
association, the contract containing an exclusive hiring-hall provision
whereby the union was to dispatch casual employees to members of
the association on a seniority basis, irrespective of union membership.
Employers seeking casual employees were obligated to call upon the
union dispatching service before looking elsewhere.' Slater, a union
member who had previously used the hiring hall, in this instance
secured casual employment with Motor Express, a party to the contract, without obtaining union referral. Subsequently Slater was discharged by his employer on complaint of the union that he had
been employed in violation of the referral agreement. The National
Labor Relations Board found' that the exclusive hiring-hall provision was illegal per sea and that Slater's discharge thereunder constituted a violation of the statute4 by both the employer and the
The contract provisions relating to hiring of casual employees were as follows:
Casual employees shall, wherever the Union maintains a dispatching service,
be employed only on a seniority basis in the Industry whenever such senior employees are available. An available list with seniority status will be kept by the
Unions and employees requested will be dispatched upon call to any employer
who is a party to this Agreement. Seniority rating of such employees shall begin
with a minimum of three months service in the Industry, irrespective of
whether such employee is or is not a member of the Union.
Discharge of any employee by any employer shall be grounds for removal
of any employee from seniority status. No casual employee shall be employed
by any employer who is a party to this Agreement in violation of seniority
status if such employees are available and if the dispatching service for such
employees is available, The employer shall first call the Union or the dispatching hall designated by the Union for such help. In the event the employer is notified that such help is not available, or in the event the employees
called for do not appear for work at the time designated by the employer,
the employer may hire from any other available source.
"The Board's decision and order are reported in Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express Inc.,
121 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1958).
3 This finding was based on the absence in this case of the contract provisions required
under the Mountain Pac. doctrine. See note 24 infra and accompanying text. See also
note 30 infra.
' The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§5 151-66 (1956), provides in relevant part:
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a) (3).
Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
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The Board then ordered, inter alia, that the employer and

union jointly and severally reimburse all casual employees of Motor
Express for fees and dues paid by them to the union beginning six

months prior to the date of the filing of the charge.! Held: (1) Illegal
discrimination may not be inferred from the face of an exclusive

hiring-hall agreement which prohibits discrimination based on union
membership and is coupled with no other provisions calling for illegal
conduct. (2) The dues reimbursement remedy is not applicable where
there is no showing that union membership, fees, or dues have been
coerced by reason of an unfair labor practice." Teamsters Union v.

NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).'
Hiring halls were developed in industries such as the maritime and
construction trades in order to alleviate some of the peculiar hardships to both employees and employers caused by the characteristically
sporadic and temporary nature of employment in those industries.
The funneling of employment opportunities through a central agency
eliminated time-consuming and repetitious job-hunting by individual
workmen and provided for those workmen a measure of employment
security otherwise unattainable. These arrangements also provided
a dependable source of manpower for employers in need of workmen for jobs of limited duration.9 Thus, there is little question that
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ....
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . . . ;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership ....
As the charges against the union and company were not filed within six months of
the execution of the contract in question no finding was based on the execution of the
contract. 121 N.L.R.B. 1629, 1630 n.2 (1958). See Section 10(b) of the NLRA, 49

Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1956).
6 This finding was based on the application of the Brown-Olds remedy. See text
accompanying note 31 infra.
'The decision in United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961), decided
on the same day as the instant case, is said by the Court to be dispositive of the dues
reimbursement issue in this case, and the Court's reasoning in the Carpenters case will
be discussed in this Note in order that the two related problems may be presented together.
Counsel for the union and for the Board agreed that the principal argument on the dues
reimbursement issue would be made in Carpenters. Brief for the union, p. 15; Brief for
the Board, p. 3 n.1.
' On petition of the union for review of the Board's action, the court of appeals upheld
the Board in ruling that the hiring-hall agreement was illegal per se, but set aside that
portion of the order requiring a general reimbursement of dues and fees. 275 F.2d 646
(1960).
' See, e.g., Fenton, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Control of Hiring-A Critical
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hiring halls served a real economic need in those industries. With
the advent of the National Labor Relations Act,"0 and the attendant
increase in union strength and bargaining power, hiring halls came
to be operated almost exclusively by unions,1 often in conjunction
with closed shops" which were then entirely legal. 3 This meant that
the individual workman's employment opportunities depended entirely upon union sponsorship, and the situation was compounded
by the union's then legitimate power to refuse vital union membership to an individual on arbitrary bases. 4 These evils aroused public
opinion and led to the passage of the Labor Management Relations
Act 5 in 1947, under which closed shops were outlawed. However,
the Act, both as enacted in 1947 and as amended in 1959," contains
no language which expressly abolishes the union hiring hall or establishes specific conditions under which such halls may be operated.
Moreover, Senator Taft expressed his opinion that union-controlled
hiring halls were not illegal per se and that they should be allowed
Examination, 4 Vill. L. Rev. 339 (1959); Rains, Construction Trades Hiring Halls, 10
Lab. L.J. 363, 366-69 (1959). See generally Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Hall (1955).
149 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1946).
" See, e.g., Haber & Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building
Trades 62-64, 71 (1956); U.S. Dept. of Labor, Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union
Status, January 1945, 60 Monthly Labor Rev. 816-822 (1945).
" That is, a contract requiring union membership at the outset of employment as
distinguished from one requiring membership some time after employment commences.
The latter is called a union shop and is presently valid if certain conditions are met. See
note 16 infra.
"3Prior to the amendment in 1947, § 8(a) (3) of the NLRA included the proviso
that "nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership
therein." 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
1" Senator Taft stated on the floor of the Senate the closed shop
is best exemplified by the so-called hiring halls on the west coast, where
shipowners cannot employ anyone unless the union sends him to them ....
Such an arrangement gives the union tremendous power over the employees;
furthermore, it abolishes a free labor market. A man cannot get a job where
he wants to get it. He has to go to the union first; and if the union says that
he cannot get in, then he is out of that particular labor field.
93 Cong. Rec. 3836 (1947).
'561 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1956).
16 The proviso to § 8 (a) (3) was amended to read "nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment .... .. " In order to limit the effect of the unions' discretion in refusing membership, Congress added an additional proviso:
no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than
the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1956).
"CLabor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959)
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

so long as they were not operated in such a way as to create a
closed shop."
Within this framework of policy considerations, the National
Labor Relations Board was forced to perform a balancing act. On

the one hand it was apparent that the hiring hall served an extremely
useful function and should be allowed to exist, and yet on the other
hand there was the obligation of the Board to carry out the broad

policy goals of the Act. 9 The factor which made this balancing so
difficult was that the very structure of the union-operated hiring
hall tended to camouflage forbidden discrimination, and there was
evidence of widespread circumvention of the ban against preferential
treatment of union members through the operation of hiring halls,
at least in some industries."

Initially, the Board's approach was to correct specific discriminatory abuses as they arose in individual cases." Of course, in cases
where the contract provided specifically for discriminatory measures,
the Board found the provisions to be illegal." But in cases in which
the collective bargaining contract provided only for a union-operated
hiring hall, absent specific discriminatory measures, the predominant

view expressed by the Board and obtaining greater acceptance by the
courts was in favor of the validity of the hiring-hall provision." In
Rep. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1950):
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts did not find hiring halls
as such illegal, but merely certain practices under them. The Board and the
court found that the manner in which the hiring halls operated created in
effect a closed shop in violation of the law. Neither the law nor these decisions
forbid hiring halls, even hiring halls operated by the unions as long as they
are not so operated as to create a closed shop with all of the abuses possible
under such arrangements, including discrimination against employees, prospective employees, . . . and operation of a closed union.
"9In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954), the Court said that
"the policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights . . .
to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent
members, or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood."
" See, e.g., Haber & Levinson, op. cit. supra note 11, at 71; Craig, Hiring Hall Arrangements and Practices, 9 Lab. L.J. 939, 942 (1958).
"1American President Lines, 101 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1952); National Maritime Union,
(did not pass on the legality of the hiring hall provision),
78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948)
enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950). Compare
Del E. Webb Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1952) with Hunkin-Conkey
Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951). Fenton, supra note 9, at 356, says "the bulk of
the cases have not dealt with the legality of the hiring-hall agreement but have, rather,
taken the view that only where the evidence demonstrates actual discrimination in operation
"
does an exclusive hiring hall violate the act ...
'a NLRB v. Waterfront Employers, 211 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Alaska
S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1954); Lummus Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1628 (1952), enforced
as modified, 210 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1954); American President Lines, 101 N.L.R.B.
(recognizing rule); Pacific Am. Shipowners Ass'n, 98 N.L.R.B. 582
1417 (1952)
(1952); Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 89 N.L.R.B. 894 (1950); National Maritime Union, 82
N.L.R.B. 1365 (1949); see NLRB v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1953).
'SEichleay Corp. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1953); Hunkin-Conkey Constr. Co.,
95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951), approved in NLRB v. Swinerton, 202 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1953),
"Ss.
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1958, however, the Board departed from its earlier course and in
Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors" laid
down tests to be applied in subsequent exclusive hiring-hall arrangements."5 Under the Mountain Pac. rules an exclusive hiring-hall provision would be found illegal per se, regardless of the presence or
absence of specific discriminatory practices thereunder, unless it provided that (1) selection of applicants for referral would be on a
nondiscriminatory basis, unaffected by the applicant's union status
or by union regulations, (2) the employer had the right to reject
any job applicant referred by the union, and (3) the provisions
relating to the functioning of the hiring hall would be posted for
the inspection of applicants."
Necessary to the establishment of the Board's position (which
was accepted and well-presented by Mr. Justice Clark in his dissent
in the instant case) was that Section 8(a) (3) discrimination included any difference in treatment in hiring." The Board reasoned
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953); see NLRB v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 211 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1954) (stating that a referral system is not per se invalid). See also Missouri
Boiler & Sheet Iron Works, 93 N.L.R.B. 319 (1951)
(stating that the mere fact that an
employer uses union employment facilities is not, per se, indicative of hiring practices
condemned by the statute). But see NLRB v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 255 F.2d
703 (3d Cir. 1958) (the court stated that a union may not insist that an employer subordinate his own hiring preference to the union's referral arrangement).
24 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
" The Board's decision in Mountain Pac. was subsequently denied enforcement. Note
24 supra. The case was remanded to the Board for a determination as to whether the
hiring hall was in fact operated so as to prefer union members. The Board accepted the
remand, and, finding evidence of such illegal preference, issued a supplemental decision on
that basis. Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, 127 N.L.R.B.
1393 (1960).
2 Board Member Murdock, in his dissent in Mountain Pac., had the following interesting comments concerning the Board's action:
For more than 7 years it has been well-established Board law, judicially approved
in every circuit court of appeals in which the issue was raised, that an exclusive
nondiscriminatory hiring hall is not per se unlawful. Now for the first time,
in a sweeping decision ignoring all Board and court precedents, the majority
holds that such a contract is unlawful. . . . The majority now says that a
nondiscriminatory hiring hall, which the Board, the courts, and Senator
Taft regarded as perfectly legal, runs counter to the express proscription of
the statute unless objective standards are included in the hiring-hall contract. . . . My understanding of the law is that the General Counsel must
prove by a preponderance of the testimony that the discharge was intended to
encourage or discourage union membership. . . . To my knowledge this is the
first time that the Board or any court has found an unfair labor practice
solely on the ground that the respondent failed to express a lawful motivation
at the time the alleged unfair labor practice occurred. . . . Senator Taft was
in agreement with previous Board and court decisions to the effect that
where the General Counsel had proved that an ostensible nondiscriminatory
hiring hall was, in fact, operated as a closed shop or in an otherwise discriminatory manner, the practice was unlawful.
119 N.L.R.B. 883, 887-91 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
" The Board, in its brief in the principal case, p. 9, states:
The divided structure of Section 8 (a) (3), which deals separately with "discrimination" and "encouragement," shows that the former term refers to a
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that discrimination existed where only workers referred by the
union were able to obtain employment." The Board then found that,
in the absence of a meeting of the Mountain Pac. requirements, this
discrimination tended to encourage union membership because it was
widely known among workers that these arrangements had led to
favoritism toward union members in the past.2" Hence, the Board

hypothesized that in cases in which the three Mountain Pac. requirements had not been met, there was a violation because of the
contract, 0 regardless of the manner in which it was actually enforced.
In order to put teeth into the mandate of Mountain Pac. the
Board announced that in subsequent cases involving illegal hiringhall provisions it would use the dues reimbursement remedy,a" under
which employers and unions could be liable to refund to all employees
covered by the illegal agreement all dues, fees, and assessments paid
into the union from a date six months prior to the filing of the
unfair labor practice charge." The dues reimbursement remedy,
commonly called the Brown-Olds remedy,"a was claimed to be within
the Board's grant of power under Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act,as which authorized the Board, after finding
an unfair labor practice, not only to issue a cease and desist order
disparity of treatment between employees in their hire or employment, and
that the latter term describes the kind of disparity which is forbidden.
The division of the job applicants by the contract in the present case into
those who are cleared for employment through the hiring hall and are thereby
eligible for work, and those who are not so cleared and are thereby precluded
from working, thus constitutes discrimination within the statutory meaning.
s It was not thought by the Board that such discrimination was itself illegal; however,
"such disparity does not constitute a violation . . . until it is further shown that the
difference in treatment encourages or discourages union membership. . . . if it can be
shown that this discrimination encourages union membership, the violation is complete."
Brief for the union, p. 19.
9 In its opinion in Mountain Pac. the Board said:
Here the very grant of work at all depends solely upon union sponsorship,
and it is reasonable to infer that the arrangement displays and enhances the
Union's power and control over the employment status. Here all that appears
is unilateral union determination and subservient employer action with no
aboveboard explanation as to the reason for it, and it is reasonable to infer
that the Union will be guided in its concessions with an eye towards winning
compliance with a membership obligation or union fealty in some other
respect. Employers have surrendered all hiring authority to the Union and
have given notice via the established hiring hall to the world at large that the
Union is arbitrary master and is contractually guaranteed to remain so.
119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 (1957).
a In the Board's opinion in the principal case it was flatly stated without giving
reasons therefor that "none of these safeguards essential to the legality of an exclusive
hiring arrangement is contained in the contract to which Respondents are parties." 121
N.L.R.B. 1629, 1630 (1958).
ai See Address by Jerome D. Fenton, General Counsel, NLRB, Ill. State Bar Ass'n,
Dec. 7, 1958, in 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. 46 (1958).
aSee Note, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1192 (1959).
aa See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
3449 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1956).
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but also "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the
policies of this Act."" The Board's power had been interpreted not
to include the issuance of penal sanctions,"' and prior to 1943 the
Board's power to require reimbursement of checked-off dues 7 had
been repeatedly denied."8 However, in 1943, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of the Board to require dues reimbursement, s
at least in situations where company-dominated unions operating
under closed shop provisions could be considered to have coerced
membership, dues, and fees. Subsequently, the remedy gained greater
acceptance in the appeals courts," and it was expanded and applied
in situations in which the unions were not company-dominated. 1

Thus, in 1956 the Board ordered dues reimbursement in Brown-Olds
Plumbing 0' Heating Corp." on an inference that dues were being
coerced under an illegal closed shop agreement. The instant case is
the first of several cases in which the Board applied the dues reimbursement remedy to hiring arrangements which, though not

operated as closed shops, were considered to have a similar effect
of illegal encouragement of union membership due to the lack of
safeguards, as required under Mountain Pac., over the union's exclusive control of worker referral. 3
In refusing to grant validity to the Mountain Pac. requirements,
the Court appears to have reached the correct result under the

present statute. It is highly doubtful that Congress intended under
Section 8 (a) (3) to ban anything more than discrimination in hiring
or firing based on union status and accomplished with a purpose
35 The application of this broad remedial power is subject to judicial control, since
the courts of appeals may deny enforcement to any order which they feel exceeds the
limits of the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 625
(2d Cir. 1941); Western Union Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1940); cf.
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
a"Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-13 (1940); see UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958) (dictum).
" The phrase "checked-off" refers to the procedure by which a company deducts union
dues and assessments from the employee's pay check.
38 Prior to 1943, five circuits in eleven cases refused to enforce Board orders requiring
reimbursement of checked-off union dues. It seems that the punitive character of the
order was the controlling factor in each case. See cases cited in Virginia Elec. & Power Co.
v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 534 n.1 (1943).
"gVirginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
' It is difficult to say to just what extent the remedy was to be used, as the Board
was constantly reexamining the remedy's application. See Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 122
N.L.R.B. 692 (1958).
41 NLRB v. Parker Bros., 209 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1954); cf. NLRB v. McGough Bakeries
Corp., 153 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1946); Alaska Salmon Indus., 122 N.L.R.B. 1552 (1959).
41115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956).
, This case also represents the first approval of the Brown-Olds remedy by the full
Board. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 653 (1961). See also
NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961)
(where the remedy was applied to
a similar situation).
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of encouraging or discouraging union membership." With such an
interpretation of congressional intent in mind the Court in Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB 4 s stated that it was the "true purpose" or
"real motive" of the union or employer that constituted the test
of illegal discrimination," and the Court reiterated that position in
the principal case." Under that test "some conduct may by its very
nature contain the implications of the required intent,"" but the
Court reasonably refused to allow an inference of discriminatory
intent on the part of the union and employer when the contract
specifically provides that there shall be no difference in treatment
based on union status." Moreover, a mere showing of encouragement of union membership should not invalidate the hiring-hall
provision under Section 8 (a) (3) as "this section does not outlaw all
encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited." 5
In United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,"5 the companion case
referred to by the Court in the instant case as dispositive of the dues
reimbursement issue, 3 the Court adhered to its earlier view that the
Board is limited under Section 10(c) to corrective remedies and
" The legislative history of the statute indicates that its proponents were concerned
with prohibiting actual discrimination in the operation of hiring halls. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947).
4s347 U.S. 17 (1954).
4
0 Id. at 43.
4'365 U.S. at 675.
48 Ibid.; see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
,.In NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695, 699-700 (1961), decided on the
same day as the principal case and dealing with the application of the Mountain Pac. requirements to a hiring arrangement calling for foremen who are to be union members
to do the hiring, the Court said "in the absence of provisions calling explicitly for illegal
conduct, the contract cannot be held illegal because it failed affirmatively to disclaim all
illegal objectives." It would appear from this statement that even if there had been no
nondiscrimination clause in the principal case the holding would have been the same.
" Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
This concept is explained in some detail by Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice
Stewart joined, in his concurring opinion in the principal case. 365 U.S. at 679-682:
A mere showing of foreseeable encouragement of union status is not a sufficient
basis for a finding of violation of the statute. It has long been recognized
that an employer can make reasonable business decisions, unmotivated by an
intent to discourage union membership or protected concerted activities, although the foreseeable effect of these decisions may be to discourage what the
act protects. . . . In general, this Court has assumed that a finding of a
violation . . . requires an affirmative showing of a motivation of encouraging
or discouraging union status or activity .... For present purposes, it is sufficient
to note that what is involved in the general requirement of finding of forbidden motivation . . . is a realization that the Act was not intended to
interfere significantly with those activities of employer and union which are
justified by nondiscriminatory business purposes, or by nondiscriminatory
attempts to benefit all the represented employees.
5'365 U.S. 651 (1961).
" See note 7 supra.

1962]

NOTES

may not make use of punitive sanctions." s In Carpenters the Board
had found an illegal closed shop agreement, and that finding was
not questioned before the Court. But in neither Carpenters nor the
principal case was there any evidence that membership, fees, or dues
were actually coerced. The Court's theory, which seems to be sound,
was that the dues reimbursement remedy applied under such circumstances would exceed the bound of corrective action, for where the
union itself is legally created, it must be assumed in the light of the
history of trade unionism that some, if not all, of its members are
voluntary members. In such a case the burden logically should be
upon the Board to prove the actual existence of coercion, and such
coercion should not be inferred. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 4 the case from which the Board's theory had developed and
in which coercion was inferred, was distinguished on the basis that
a worker could never be considered a willing member of an illegal
company-dominated union controlled by the very employer against
whom it should be prepared to protect its members' interests."
Both issues presented to the Court in the principal case have
been decided in conformity with prior Supreme Court interpretations of the statutes involved. Yet social desirability is seldom completely reflected in a given statutory scheme, and it may well be
that hiring halls need more regulation than the statutes presently
afford. The Board's contention in Mountain Pac. is certainly a
thought-provoking argument in favor of additional insulation of
job rights from union status, especially at a time when considerations
of individual freedom seem to be of paramount importance. Moreover, even those regulations now existing cry for more effective enforcement methods," and though the dues reimbursement remedy
which the Board attempted to use may well have been unduly harsh
in application, a series of less harsh statutory penalties could go far
toward guaranteeing the desired objectives.
James R. Craig

See note 36 supra.
See note 39 supra.
" "That case involved a company union whose very existence was unlawful .... Return
of dues was one of the means for disestablishing an unlawful union." 365 U.S. 651, 654
(1961).
6
" Brief for the Board, pp. 10-11, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651 (1961), points out that
in 1956, finding that, despite the ban which the Taft-Hartley amendments
had imposed nine years earlier, closed-shop practices were still rampant, the
Board concluded that a remedy more effective than a cease and desist order
was required if such practices were to be curtailed and the statutory policy
which they impaired vindicated.
53
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